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Abstract
This paper analyzes the redistributional effects of long-run inflation on income,
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1 Introduction
With over three rounds of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve to combat the Great
Recession of 2007-09, policymakers have raised serious concerns about the impact of the rise
in future inflation. Much of the existing literature has discussed how rising inflation impacts
the economy as a whole. These studies measure the welfare costs of inflation and find that
in general, a rise in long-run inflation reduces social welfare. In particular, households would
give up some consumption to achieve zero inflation from a moderate level of inflation. This
has been quantified as being less than 1% of consumption which is a fairly small cost. For
instance, Easterly and Fischer (2001) use polling data for a large number of households in
thirty-eight countries and find evidence that inflation is a relatively bigger concern for low-
income households than high-income households. They report that the change in low-income
households’ share of national income, the percent decline in poverty and other measures of
improvements in their well-being are negatively correlated with inflation. With the notable
exceptions of Imrohoroglu (1992), Erosa and Ventura (2002) and more recently Camera and
Chien (2014), the literature has largely ignored the redistributional impact of inflation in a
cash-in-advance framework.
The focus of this paper is to analyze the redistributional effects of long-run inflation
among different income groups in the United States. This paper builds on previous stud-
ies. Similar to Stockman (1981), we introduce money into the model via a cash-in-advance
constraint that applies to consumption and investment. Then, we extend his representative
agent framework to allow for consumer heterogeneity so that we can assess the distributional
impact of inflation. In our model, consumer heterogeneity in labor productivity and sub-
jective discount factors is introduced amongst ten income groups. The labor productivity
and subjective discount factors are chosen to match the wealth and income distribution in
the United States in 2007. Several studies incorporate discount factor heterogeneity in a
model economy to explain wealth and income inequality, see for instance, Suen (2014) and
Hendricks (2007). As an another feature of the U.S. economy, we introduce progressive tax
structure into our model, following Li and Sarte (2004) and Lansing and Guo (1998). More-
over, this modeling assumption ensures that not all households eventually face the highest
marginal tax rate simply as a result of economic growth.1 Long-run inflation, which results
from lump-sum monetary injections by the central bank, alters the distribution of disposable
income, of wealth and of consumption.
On the aggregate level the transmission mechanism is the following. The central bank
carries out equal lump-sum monetary transfers to households that raise inflation. The re-
sulting increase in the cost of holding money reduces money holdings by households. Given
the cash-in-advance constraint, the decrease in money holdings leads to lower consumption
and lower investment. We find that consumption inequality reduces as inflation increases.
On the disaggregate level, there are distributional effects. The main finding is that inflation
reduces inequality in consumption, disposable income, and cash holdings. Particularly, the
bottom 60% of the income distribution gains during inflationary periods, whereas the top
40% loses. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the bottom 20% of the population. Even
though the top 40% of the distribution loses, their consumption patterns do not change as
1As in Sarte (1997), a progressive tax schedule helps avoid the kind of degenerate equilibrium as analyzed
in Becker (1980).
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much because of their large wealth holdings.
In general, there are only a handful of studies that analyze the effects of inflation on
redistribution of income and wealth in a heterogenous-agent economy. Broadly, these can be
categorized into three areas: studies with cash-in advance models (Imrohoroglu (1992), Erosa
and Ventura (2002), Camera and Chien (2014)); studies using matching models of money
(Molico (2006), Boel and Camera (2009), Chiu and Molico (2010)); and models where money
plays a precautionary role (Akyol (2004) and Wen (2015)).
The studies typically differ in the way they introduce money in the theoretical model.
However, most of these studies do introduce asset(s) so that agents can protect themselves
against inflation and money is valued because agents can self-insure against some idiosyn-
cratic shock. In Cash-in-advance (CIA) models, however, agents are not able to switch
from holding money to holding assets.2 Survey data provides evidence, based on the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), on average (between 1989-2007) nearly 60% of U.S. house-
holds do not hold any nonmonetary financial assets(interest-bearing assets),and about 50%
of those that hold checking accounts do not hold any interest-bearing assets. Thus, welfare
costs in could be higher in CIA models but also well-justified by the most recent survey data
available. The welfare losses predicted by the aforementioned studies differ significantly. For
instance, Wen (2015) introduces money as having a precautionary role and reports that to
avoid a 10% increase in inflation, agents reduce consumption by 8%. In another study by
Erosa and Ventura (2002) in a CIA economy with cash and credit goods, 10% inflation is
worth 1.6% consumption.3
Boel and Camera (2009) obtain similar results although they introduce money in a match-
ing model. This suggests that the financial structure of the economy is important in analyzing
these effects. For instance, Akyol (2004) reports that 10% inflation maximizes social wel-
fare, whereas another study by Chiu and Molico (2010) reports that 10% inflation is worth
0.6% of average consumption in the U.S.. Imrohoroglu (1992) considers a pure exchange
cash-in-advance economy with idiosyncratic endowment risk and finds that inflation lowers
welfare, but the area below the money demand curve, underestimates the welfare cost by
several times. Camera and Chien (2014) report that when shocks are sufficiently persistent,
moderate inflations can generate welfare gains whereas large inflations are always costly.
They offer several insights about the impact of long-run inflation on key macroeconomic
variables and suggest that disparities in earlier results can be reconciled with disparities in
either the assumed financial structure or in the persistence of shocks. They report that when
inflation is generated through lump-sum money creation, higher inflation lowers inequality
in disposable income, but it permanently reduces overall income and, hence, depresses ag-
gregate consumption. Therefore, inflation can improve average welfare only if it is capable
to sufficiently reduce consumption inequality, which is zero in the efficient allocation.
Among the quantitative and sectoral studies, Doepke and Schneider (2006) suggest that in
the United States, a moderate episode of inflation causes significant redistribution of wealth
amongst rich, middle-class and poor households. They find that in a 5 percent inflation
2Some studies have also incorporated the CIA constraint to analyze the equilibrium growth effect of
money/inflation, see for instance, Chen and Guo (2011).
3They find that inflation may lead to a substantial concentration in the distribution of wealth and,
assuming increasing returns to scale from credit transactions, inflation acts as a regressive consumption tax
because low-income agents use mostly cash for trade.
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experiment, a coalition of rich and old households loses, in present-value terms, between
5.7 and 15.2 percent of GDP. They also find that about two-thirds of this loss accrues to
households in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution. On the winners side, about 75
percent of the total gains in the household sector benefit middle-class households under the
age of 45, which receive a gift worth up to 45 percent of mean cohort net worth. 4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3
discusses the competitive equilibrium, Section 4 describes our calibration exercise, Section 5
presents our findings and Section 6 concludes. The derivations and tables can be found in
Appendix A.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
We consider a model economy which is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived house-
holds. The size of the population is normalized to one. The population is divided into
s groups where the size of each group i in total population is denoted by µi ∈ (0, 1), for
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., s} and
s∑
i=1
µi = 1. The groups differ from each other in terms of labor pro-
ductivity and rate of time preference. Agents within each group are identical. The labor
productivity ei and discount factor βi ∈ (0, 1) of a type i individual is deterministic and
known for each of the s groups. The preferences of a typical agent in group i is given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ci,t), (1)
where ci,t is the consumption of an individual in group i at time t. The (period) utility
function u (c) is identical for all types of consumers and is given by
u(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ if σ 6= 1;σ ≥ 0
2.2 The Agent’s Problem
Agents receive total taxable income yi,t which is composed of labor income from work and
interest income from savings. The agent can hold two types of assets: real assets denoted
by ai,t that give a rate of return rt and nominal money holding at the beginning of period
t denoted by Mi,t.The real asset depreciates at a rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. There is a progressive tax
τt which is a function in total taxable income yi,t . The properties of the tax schedule are
discussed in detail in Section 2.4. The fraction of investment which is subject to the cash-
in-advance constraint is controlled by ψ ∈ [0, 1], as in Dotsey and Sarte (2000). The values
ψ = 0 and ψ = 1 correspond to the Clower (1967) and Stockman (1981) versions. When
ψ = 0, the CIA constraint only applies on consumption purchases and when ψ = 1, the
4They emphasize the role of money as a unit of account for assets and liabilities: inflation affects all
nominal asset positions, not just cash positions. As a result, they find that even moderate inflation leads to
substantial wealth redistribution
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CIA constraint applies to both consumption and investment. Given a sequence of wages
(wt), rental rate of capital (rt) and price level (Pt) at time t, the agents’ problem is to
maximize their discounted lifetime utility, subject to sequences of budget constraints and
CIA constraints. Formally, a type i household solves:
max
{ci,t,ai,t+1,Mi,t+1}
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ci,t) where βi ∈ (0, 1) (2)
s.t.
ci,t + ψ[ai,t+1 − ai,t] ≤ Mi,t
Pt
, (3)
and
ci,t + ai,t+1 − ai,t + Mi,t+1
Pt
= yi,t − τt(yi,t) + Mi,t
Pt
+ ζt , (4)
where wtei + rtai,t = yi,t . The timing of production and trade follows that of the cash-
in-advance economy described in Stockman (1981). Each agent allocates his/her income
between money and asset holdings. (3) represents the liquidity or the CIA constraint which
states that the individual must be able to finance his purchases of current consumption and
gross investment out of money balances carried over from the previous period.
Let real money holdings on period t and real transfers in period t be denoted by mi,t and
ζt. Let the gross inflation factor be defined as pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt. Also, let λi,t and θi,t denote
the Lagrangian multipliers on the CIA and budget constraints.
Then, the first order conditions of the agents’ problem with respect to ci,t, mi,t+1 and
ai,t+1 are given by the following:
u′(ci,t) = λi,t + θi,t , (5)
βi(λi,t+1 + θi,t+1) = pit+1θi,t , (6)
βi[ψλi,t+1 + θi,t+1{1 + rt+1(1− τ ′t+1(yi,t+1))}] = ψλi,t + θi,t , (7)
(5) equates the marginal utility of current consumption to the marginal cost of current
consumption which is the marginal indirect utility of having an additional real dollar. (6)
equates the marginal value of having an additional nominal dollar at the beginning of the next
period, deflated by the gross inflation factor, to the marginal cost of having that additional
dollar. (7) equates the marginal benefit of an additional unit of capital which consists of the
discounted value of goods it produces next period to the marginal cost of an additional unit
of capital. Then, the agents’ first order conditions are combined to yield the following Euler
equation:
ψu
′
(ci,t) = [βiψ− (1−ψ) βi
pit+1
]u′(ci,t+1)+β2i {
1
pit+1
(rt+1−τ ′t+1(yi,t+1)rt+1 +1)−
ψ
pit+2
}u′(ci,t+2).
(8)
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This equation governs the law of motion for consumption. The Euler equation can be
interpreted as follows: the marginal cost of foregoing one unit of consumption at time t, is
equal to the discounted marginal benefit the agent receives from consuming in period t+1
and t+2. The discounted marginal benefit is also deflated by next period’s inflation.
2.3 Production
Output is produced according to the standard neoclassical production function:
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), (9)
where Yt is aggregate output at time t, Kt is aggregate capital at time t, Lt is aggregate
labor and At is the level of labor augmenting technology at time t. The labor augmenting
technology grows at a constant exogenous rate γ ≥ 1,which implies At ≡ γt for all t. The
share of capital in total income is given by α. The gross return on physical capital is given
by Rt.
Since we assume constant returns to scale in our production, the representative firm
maximizes profits as follows:
max
Kt,Lt
{F (Kt, AtLt)− wtLt −RtKt}. (10)
The solution of the firms problem is then characterized by the following first order con-
ditions:
wt = AtFL(Kt, AtLt) = (1− α)Yt
Lt
, (11)
Rt = FK(Kt, AtLt) = α
Yt
Kt
. (12)
Depreciation in capital can be viewed as a reduction of rate of return obtained from
holding physical capital and thus we have,
rt = Rt − δ. (13)
2.4 Government Policies
We consider two kinds of policies here: Monetary and Fiscal policy.
2.4.1 Monetary Policy
Let the nominal money supply at period t be given by M
s
t , real money supply by mi,t, price
level of output at time t by Pt.
M
s
t+1 = gM
s
t = M
s
t + Ptζt = Pt+1
s∑
i=1
µimi,t+1 (14)
Assuming that the central bank issues transfers at the rate of g every period, we have
M
s
t+1 = gM
s
t . Since, money is introduced via lump sum transfers ζt at the end of each
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period, we have, M
s
t+1 = M
s
t + Ptζt. The last term equates the nominal value of all real
money holdings in period t+ 1, Pt+1
s∑
i=1
µimi,t+1 to the nominal value of the money supply in
t+ 1, M
s
t+1.
2.4.2 Fiscal Policy
The government imposes a progressive tax τt which is a function in total taxable income yi,t
on agent’s every period to finance it’s expenditure on goods and services in period t denoted
by Gt. The government balances its budget in each period and chooses a tax schedule
summarized by the average tax rate (ATR)
Tax schedule = ATR = η(
yit
γt
)φ with 0 ≤ η < 1, φ > 0 (15)
just like in Lansing and Guo (1998) and Li and Sarte (2004). Here, the parameters η
and φ determine the level and the slope of the tax schedule. With a progressive tax system,
households with higher taxable income are subject to higher tax rates, so that
Total tax paid = τt(yit) = yitη(
yit
γt
)φ. (16)
Once we know our tax schedule, we can discuss the progressivity of the tax structure by
calculating the ratio of the marginal and average tax rates.
MTR = τ ′t(yit) = (1 + φ)η(
yit
γt
)φ = (1 + φ)ATR.
Since the parameter φ captures the degree of progressivity of the tax structure, progres-
sive, proportional and regressive tax structures would correspond to φ > 0, φ = 0, φ < 0. A
tax schedule is said to be progressive whenever the marginal tax rate exceeds the average
tax rate at all levels of taxable income.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
Let ct = (c1,t, c2,t...cs,t) , at = (a1,t, a2,t...as,t) and mt = (m1,t, m2,t...ms,t) denote a distri-
bution of consumption, capital and money across the s groups at time t. The competitive
equilibrium consists of a sequence of distributions of consumption and capital, {ct, at,mt}∞t=0,
sequences of aggregate inputs, {Kt, Lt}∞t=0 and sequences of prices, {wt, rt, Pt}∞t=0, so that:
1. Given prices {wt, rt, pit+1}∞t=0 , the sequences {cit, ait,mit}∞t=0 solve each type-i agent’s
problem.
2. Given prices {wt, Rt}∞t=0 and the aggregate inputs Kt and Lt solve the representative
firm’s problem.
3. The government’s budget is balanced every period.
4. All markets clear every period so that,
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Equilibrium in Labor market:
Lt =
s∑
i=1
µiei = e (17)
where e represents the aggregate level of labor productivity.
Equilibrium in Capital market:
Kt =
s∑
i=1
µiai,t (18)
By Walras’ Law, the goods market clears.
Equilibrium in money market:
M
s
t+1 = gM
s
t = M
s
t + Ptζt = Pt+1
s∑
µi
i=1
mi,t+1 (19)
Also, the government budget constraint is satisfied:
Gt =
s∑
i=1
µiτt(yi,t) (20)
3.1 Balanced Growth Path
This paper focuses on a balanced growth path. A balanced growth path is a competitive
equilibrium along which (i) all variables are growing at the constant growth rate γ > 1, and
(ii) the real rate of return, r, is constant over time.
Thus,
mi,t+1
mi,t
=
g
pi
= γ (21)
For CIA constraint to be binding along a balanced growth path, we must have λi,t > 0
which implies the following:
u′(ci,t)− β
pit+1
u′(ci,t+1) > 0
The above inequality suggests that for the CIA constraint to be binding, the marginal
benefit that the agent receives by increasing consumption at time t by one unit must exceed
the marginal cost the agent incurs due to a decrease cash holdings at time t that results in
the loss of utility at time t+1 discounted by the rate of time preference and inflation. We
can further write the inequality as follows:
(
ci,t+1
ci,t
)σ >
βi
pi
∀i (22)
or γσ >
βi
pi
∀i (23)
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For our exercise, we assume that this inequality is binding.
4 Calibration
We now assess our model to see the redistributional effects of inflation in the United States.
There are three parts to our quantitative exercise that are explained in the following subsec-
tions. We construct a benchmark balanced-growth equilibrium to match some of key features
of the U.S. economy. In our analysis, the model period is assumed to be one year.
All benchmark parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The benchmark balanced
growth equilibrium is constructed to match the following features of the U.S. economy: the
capital-output ratio, capital’s share of income, average annual growth rate of per-capita
GDP, average annual inflation rate, the progressive tax structure and the income and wealth
distributions in the United States. More specifically, the labor productivities and the sub-
jective discount factors are calibrated to match the U.S. wealth and income distributions in
2007, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance as reported in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al.
(2011).
Parameter Description Value
σ Inverse of IES 1
γ Common growth factor 1.018
α Share of capital income in total output 0.36
δ Depreciation rate 0.08
pi − 1 Average annual Inflation Rate (1950-07) 0.038
r∗ Equilibrium interest rate 0.04
ψ Fraction of investment subject to CIA 0.01
β10 Subjective discount factor 0.9948
1 + φ Ratio of marginal to average tax rate (1960-05) 1.738
η Scalar in income tax schedule 0.0197
Table 1: Benchmark parameters
In our benchmark case, the parameter σ that measures the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) in the utility function is set to one. The average annual
growth rate of per capita variables (γ − 1) is 1.8%, which is the annual growth rate of real
per-capita GDP in the United States over the period 1950-2007. The share of capital income
in total output (α) is 1/3. The depreciation rate is calibrated so that the capital-output
ratio is 3.0. The average annual inflation rate (pi − 1) is 3.8% which is calculated using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the period 1950-2007 . Dotsey and Sarte (2000) mention
that for the US and most OECD economies, the fraction of investment subject to the Cash-
in-advance constraint (ψ) is probably close to zero because of high financial sophistication. In
our benchmark case, we assume a very small value of (ψ)=0.1. Empirical findings show that
a higher ψ is empirically plausible supported by a significant increase in consumer credit
in the last two decades, Ludvigson (1999). Also,the average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S.
industrial firms more than doubled from 1980 to 2006 that could help firms to pay off their
9
debt entirely in cash, Bates et al. (2009). Later, we do a sensitivity analysis by considering
higher values of ψ corresponding to lower degrees of financial sophistication.
Based on the data reported in Table 5 of Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011), we first divide the
U.S. income distribution into ten groups (namely, 1-5%, 5-10%, 10-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%,
60-80%, 80-90%, 90-95%, 95-99%) implying s=10. The bottom 1% of the distribution is
discarded because the average income for this group turns out to be negative. The subjective
discount factors are chosen so as to match the share of total income held by each group
as done in the literature, see Suen (2014), Krusell and Smith (1998), Huggett (1993) and
Aiyagari (1994).5 In other words, the subjective discount factors are chosen so as to match
the Lorenz curve for income in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) sample in Dı´az-
Gime´nez et al. (2011). After the subjective discount factors are determined, we then choose
the labor productivities to match the share of total wealth owned by the ten income groups.
The data are again taken from Table 5 of Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011). This procedure is
further discussed in the Appendix A.
The ratio of marginal to average tax rates (1 + φ) are computed between the period
1950-2005.6 The average of the degree of progressivity (1 +φ = 1.738) for the specified time
period is used in our exercise. The scalar in income tax schedules η are calibrated to match
the average tax rate (ATR) of 13.8% for the same time period.
5 Findings
This section reports findings regarding the redistributional effects of inflation on consump-
tion, disposable income and cash holdings among the ten income groups as well as overall
inequality. In order to do this, we consider a number of counterfactual experiments in which
the long-run inflation rate is changed.
5.1 Benchmark results
Table 2 summarizes the Gini coefficients for income, wealth, cash-holdings and consumption
as suggested by our benchmark model vs. the data.7 The data is taken from Dı´az-Gime´nez
et al. (2011) and Wen (2015). We find that the calibrated version of our model is able to
generate patterns of income inequality that are very similar to those observed in the United
States, as given by the Gini coefficient. For the wealth distribution, the model predicts a
more equal distribution as compared to that observed in the data. Since, we have ignored
the analysis for the bottom 1% of the population in our study due to their average income
being negative, our prediction of a more equal distribution for both income and wealth may
be a direct result of having incomes as strictly positive.8 Table 3 reports the share of wealth
held as money for the ten income brackets. We find that as income increases, households
tend to hold less money as a fraction of their total wealth. The bottom 5% holds 14% of
their total wealth as money as compared to the top 1%, who hold only 6%.9 This finding is
5This involves solving a set of nonlinear equations for the subjective discount factors. The technical
details can be found in the appendix.
6Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and Taxsim are the sources used for computing the degree of progressivity.
7These results correspond to the long-run inflation rate of 3.8% for the United States.
8In the actual data, the average earnings of the bottom 1% of the distribution are negative
9Note, however that if we consider aggregate money holdings for each income bracket, they are obviously
much lower for the bottom 5% and much higher for the top 1%, see Table 7.
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also supported by the Flow of Funds data for the household sector that contain a detailed
breakdown for the assets and liability positions for the households.
Following Stockman (1981), we can recall that since money has a negative rate of re-
turn during inflation, agents have a higher opportunity cost of holding money. This reduces
the willingness to hold money. On the aggregate level the transmission mechanism is the
following. The central bank carries out equal lump-sum monetary transfers to households
that raise inflation. The resulting increase in the cost of holding money reduces money hold-
ings by households. Given the cash-in-advance constraint, the decrease in money holdings
leads to lower consumption and lower investment. We find that the cost of a 5% increase in
inflation is approximately 2.5% consumption. Tables 4, 6 and 7 provide evidence.
Our main redistributional results are analyzed in the following subsection. We perform
five counterfactual experiments in which we change the long-run inflation rate from 3.8% to
1.8%, 2.8%, 4.8%, 5.8% and 8.8%. We then report the redistributional effects for disposable
income, consumption and money and analyze our sensitivity experiments.
5.2 Redistributional Effects
We find that disposable income inequality, consumption inequality and inequality in cash-
holdings decreases as inflation rises. Tables 4, 6 and 7 provide evidence. Since all income
groups receive equal money transfers, which cause inflation we find that for all income groups,
transfers raise real money holdings while inflation reduces them. Thus, on balance, the rich
end up with decreased money holdings. Given the cash-in-advance constraint, the rich reduce
consumption while the poor raise them. On the disaggregate level, there are distributional
effects. The main finding is that inflation reduces inequality in consumption, disposable
income, and cash holdings. Particularly, the bottom 60% of the income distribution gains
during inflationary periods, whereas the top 40% loses. The rich hold more cash than the
poor and so inflation is more likely to hurt the rich than the poor in terms of cash holdings.
This is evident in Table 7. The bottom 5% hold 0.15 worth of real money balances and the
top 1% hold 13.43. Since, inflation is a direct result the lump-sum money creation that is
distributed evenly among households, the bottom 60% gains and top 40% loses in terms of
cash holdings as inflation rises. This results in making the distribution of cash holdings more
even, as reflected in the lower Gini coefficient with higher inflation.
Consumption inequality reduces as inflation increases however, we find that overall con-
sumption falls. Since inflation rate of 3.8% is our benchmark for inflation, we look at both
deflationary and inflationary episodes. Since, consumption is financed by money holdings
only in a cash-in-advance framework, we find that once again the bottom 60% gain and top
40% lose with inflation. With reference to Tables 5 and 8, we can discuss who wins and
loses from these episodes of an increase in the long-run inflation rate. Even though the top
40% of the distribution loses, their consumption patterns do not change as much because
of their large wealth holdings. We find a similar result for the net disposable income. The
Lorenz curves for disposable income are depicted in Figure 1. Lorenz curves for consumption,
money holdings and wealth follow the same pattern. Our results are similar to Doepke and
Schneider (2006) who find that the losers in the economy are the old and rich households at
the top of the distribution. The winners are the young middle class that have substantial
11
fixed-rate mortgage positions and the poor who have a sizeable amount of debt10.
5.3 Further experiments
Money is typically the only financial asset available in the framework described above. How-
ever, the impact of inflation on social welfare could depend on whether agents are able to
evade the inflation tax. Two such experiments are described below.
If the central bank issued nonuniform transfers to the ten income groups, with the bottom
60% of the population receiving significantly less than the previous case of uniform transfers,
we find that there are distributional effects but the bottom 60% of the population loses
whereas the top 40% gains. As another experiment, we looked at the consequences of having
only a part of consumption subject to the CIA constraint, with lower income households being
more dependent on cash transactions than their rich counterparts. This again generated
similar results to the nonuniform transfer exercise. However, these experiments were carried
out in an adhoc manner, since it is difficult to generate nonuniform transfers in equilibrium
and to also justify in a data driven manner, how much of the consumption for different
income groups might be subject to the CIA constraint.
5.4 Robustness Checks
The third part of our quantitative exercise is to assess whether our results are sensitive
to changes in three factors: the inverse of intertermporal elasticity of substitution, σ; the
fraction of investment subject to the cash-in-advance constraint, ψ; and hyperinflationary
episodes. The results are depicted in Tables 9, 10 and 11. We consider σ = 1 as our
benchmark case and for our sensitivity analysis, we change σ to 0.5 and 1.5. Let’s consider
an increase in the value of σ that would lower the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Ceteris paribus, each consumer would want to have less savings. The reduction in savings
would be larger for the rich relative to the poor. Also, as aggregate savings decrease the
real rate of interest would adjust in order to keep the capital to output ratio constant. This
would encourage the rich to increase asset holdings. We find that overall, with an increase
in inflation, these two effects cancel out. However, we do observe the distribution becoming
more equal with inflation in which case the first effect outweighs the latter.
We consider ψ = 0.01 as our benchmark case and for our sensitivity analysis, we change
ψ to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. These values do not affect our results. Consumption inequality still
falls with inflation even if the degree of financial sophistication in the economy is lower.
This should be the case as our model does not assume any access to sophisticated credit
or financial markets. We consider inflation rates that are 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%
above the benchmark inflation rate of 3.8% Our results are robust to changes in the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ), the fraction of investment subject to the CIA
constraint (ψ) and the hyperinflationary episodes. We also check the case when transfers
are zero and find that the Gini coefficient for disposable income change by less than 0.1%
when inflation rises by 5%. Thus, in our model, the redistributional effects are driven by the
lump-sum transfers each period that result in inflation.
10They also report similar results for having surprise inflation. In order to compare our results with Doepke
and Schneider (2006), we only focus on the experiments when inflation is fully anticipated
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6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the scant literature on the redistributional effects of inflation in
the U.S. economy. The model presented in this paper is an extension of the standard cash-
in-advance model by Stockman (1981). Our model allows for heterogeneity in the rate of
time preference and labor productivities. We use this heterogeneity to match the income
and wealth distributions in the U.S. among different income groups. In our model, the cash-
in-advance constraint on consumption and investment is introduced. We find that when the
central bank carries out uniform lump-sum monetary transfers that raise inflation, a 5% rise
in inflation costs 2.5% consumption. Redistributional effects are analyzed as well. Inflation
acts as a progressive tax when the central bank carries out uniform transfers to all income
groups whereas inflation acts as a regressive tax when the transfers are nonuniform or a part
of consumption is subject to the CIA constraint.
We also acknowledge that contrasting our model with other studies, the results presented
in this paper depend on the financial structure of the economy. First, in a model with
heterogeneity in discount factors, the experiment of changing inflation is tricky. Suppose for
a minute that all agents had high discount factors. Then the optimal long-run inflation rate
in such an economy is likely to be higher than that in an economy where all agents have low
discount factors. In a world with heterogeneous discount factors, our experiment might be
moving some agents toward their most preferred (or optimal) rate and other agents away
from their most preferred rate. So some would gain from the change in inflation independent
of the redistributive effect. If all of the agents are being moved away from their most preferred
rate then the benchmark rate may change. Second, how much consumption is subject to the
CIA constraint is difficult to calibrate since the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) does
not report it for different income groups.
Nonetheless, this study while consistent with the aggregate effects of inflation reported
in the literature provides an insight to the distributional effects of inflation. In the future, it
will be interesting to see how fiscal policy can play a significant role in shaping the aggregate,
resdistributional and macroeconomic effects of an inflation episode.
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A Appendix
A.1 Results
Gini Coefficients
Model Data
Income 0.56 0.575
Wealth 0.67 0.816
Cash-Holdings 0.467 -
Consumption 0.465 0.28
Table 2: Benchmark Results for Inequality in the US, Model vs. Data; Data Sources: Dı´az-
Gime´nez et al. (2011) and Wen (2015)
Model
Bottom 1-5% 0.1481
5-10% 0.3229
10-20% 0.2369
20-40% 0.2639
40-60% 0.2735
60-80% 0.2347
80-90% 0.2212
90-95% 0.1452
95-99% 0.0922
Top 99-100% 0.0632
Table 3: Share of wealth held as money as generated my the calibrated model
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Income groups/Inflation 1.8% 2.8% 3.8% 4.8% 5.8% 8.8%
Bottom 1-5% 0.136 0.146 0.155 0.165 0.174 0.201
5-10% 0.199 0.208 0.217 0.226 0.234 0.259
10-20% 0.279 0.287 0.296 0.304 0.312 0.334
20-40% 0.463 0.469 0.475 0.482 0.488 0.506
40-60% 0.743 0.747 0.751 0.754 0.758 0.768
60-80% 1.161 1.160 1.160 1.159 1.159 1.158
80-90% 1.712 1.706 1.700 1.694 1.688 1.673
90-95% 2.351 2.339 2.326 2.314 2.303 2.270
95-99% 4.105 4.075 4.045 4.016 3.988 3.907
Top 99-100% 13.396 13.272 13.151 13.032 12.916 12.508
Aggregate 24.484 24.413 24.280 24.150 24.023 23.661
Gini C 0.474 0.469 0.465 0.460 0.455 0.443
Table 4: Aggregate and distributional effects for consumption when counterfactual experi-
ments of changing the benchmark long-run inflation rate of 3.8% are considered
Gain/loss in consumption
Income groups pi = 1.018 pi = 1.028 pi = 1.048 pi = 1.058 pi = 1.088
Bottom 1-5% -12.38 -6.09 6.03 11.93 29.07
5-10% -8.33 -4.14 4.05 8.01 19.56
10-20% -5.57 -2.76 2.7 5.36 13.1
20-40% -2.69 -1.32 1.32 2.6 6.38
40-60% -0.97 -0.47 0.47 0.94 2.34
60-80% 0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.13
80-90% 0.69 0.34 -0.33 -0.67 -1.57
90-95% 1.06 0.52 -0.51 -1.01 -2.42
95-99% 1.47 0.73 -0.71 -1.41 -3.4
Top 99-100% 1.86 0.92 -0.9 -1.78 -4.88
Table 5: Percentage change in consumption from benchmark
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Income groups pi = 1.018 pi = 1.028 pi = 1.038
Benchmark
pi = 1.048 pi = 1.058 pi = 1.088
Bottom 1-5% 0.155 0.168 0.179 0.191 0.202 0.236
5-10% 0.213 0.225 0.237 0.248 0.26 0.294
10-20% 0.304 0.317 0.328 0.340 0.351 0.385
20-40% 0.498 0.513 0.524 0.535 0.547 0.581
40-60% 0.798 0.814 0.825 0.837 0.848 0.882
60-80% 1.257 1.275 1.286 1.298 1.309 1.343
80-90% 1.859 1.880 1.892 1.903 1.915 1.949
90-95% 2.639 2.664 2.676 2.687 2.698 2.732
95-99% 4.842 4.877 4.890 4.901 4.912 4.946
Top 99-100% 16.704 16.749 16.787 16.798 16.808 16.841
Gini DY 0.491 0.486 0.482 0.478 0.474 0.461
Table 6: Aggregate and distributional effects for disposable income when counterfactual
experiments of changing the benchmark long-run inflation rate of 3.8% are considered
Income groups pi = 1.018 pi = 1.028 pi = 1.038
Benchmark
pi = 1.048 pi = 1.058 pi = 1.088
Bottom 1-5% 0.137 0.147 0.157 0.166 0.175 0.202
5-10% 0.198 0.209 0.218 0.226 0.235 0.260
10-20% 0.279 0.289 0.297 0.305 0.313 0.336
20-40% 0.462 0.471 0.478 0.484 0.490 0.508
40-60% 0.742 0.750 0.754 0.757 0.761 0.771
60-80% 1.161 1.665 1.166 1.165 1.165 1.164
80-90% 1.712 1.7152 1.709 1.703 1.698 1.682
90-95% 2.361 2.36 2.348 2.336 2.324 2.290
95-99% 4.147 4.134 4.106 4.077 4.049 3.967
Top 99-100% 13.653 13.536 13.439 13.320 13.203 12.867
Gini m 0.476 0.471 0.467 0.462 0.458 0.445
Table 7: Aggregate and distributional effects for money holdings when counterfactual exper-
iments of changing the benchmark long-run inflation rate of 3.8% are considered
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Income groups pi = 1.038 pi = 1.088
Bottom 1-5% 0.7848 0.8885
5-10% 0.9383 1.0206
10-20% 1.0845 1.1503
20-40% 1.3717 1.4124
40-60% 1.7197 1.7377
60-80% 2.1270 2.1240
80-90% 2.5686 2.5467
90-95% 2.9665 2.9294
95-99% 3.8295 3.7630
Top 99-100% 6.7055 6.5562
Total welfare 24.0961 24.1288
Table 8: Welfare analysis
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Gain/loss in consumption (% change from benchmark)
Net Inflation Rate (pi − 1) (Above benchmark)
Income Groups 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Bottom 1-5% 56.22 102.82 142.16 176.76 207.06
5-10% 37.98 69.24 95.71 119.01 139.45
10-20% 25.56 46.47 64.16 79.83 93.58
20-40% 12.71 22.86 31.44 39.17 45.98
40-60% 4.95 8.6 11.66 14.62 17.24
60-80% 0.18 -0.12 -0.41 -0.38 -0.32
80-90% -2.57 -5.19 -7.45 -9.12 -10.56
90-95% -4.21 -8.19 -11.59 -14.27 -16.58
95-99% -6.12 -11.66 -16.38 -20.24 -23.56
Top 99-100% -7.91 -14.89 -20.9 -25.87 -30.14
Gini C 0.4229 0.3878 0.3579 0.3323 0.31
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Hyperinflation
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σ = 1.5 pi = 1.018 pi = 1.028 pi = 1.038
Benchmark
pi = 1.048 pi = 1.058 pi = 1.088
Gini C 0.4751 0.4704 0.4658 0.4612 0.4567 0.4437
Gini DY 0.4913 0.4868 0.4825 0.4782 0.474 0.4617
Gini Y 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595
Gini W 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701
σ = 0.5 pi = 1.018 pi = 1.028 pi = 1.038
Benchmark
pi = 1.048 pi = 1.058 pi = 1.088
Gini C 0.4734 0.4687 0.464 0.4595 0.455 0.4421
Gini DY 0.49 0.4871 0.4827 0.4785 0.4743 0.4621
Gini Y 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595 0.5595
Gini W 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701 0.6701
Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis: changing the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, σ
Income groups ψ = 0.1 ψ = 0.2 ψ = 0.3
Bottom 1-5% 0.136 0.156 0.157
5-10% 0.199 0.217 0.218
10-20% 0.279 0.296 0.297
20-40% 0.463 0.476 0.477
40-60% 0.743 0.751 0.753
60-80% 1.161 1.16 1.162
80-90% 1.712 1.699 1.703
90-95% 2.351 2.325 2.330
95-99% 4.105 4.042 4.048
Top 99-100% 13.396 13.141 13.136
Gini C 0.474 0.464 0.464
Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis with limited or ineffectual credit markets
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A.3 Figures
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Figure 1: Lorenz Curves for Disposable Income, showing how in case of equal transfers to
all agents in the economy generates a more equal distribution under higher counterfactual
inflation rates.
A.4 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
The agents problem can be re-written in real terms as:
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max
(ci,t,ai,t+1,mi,t+1)
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ci,t)whereβi ∈ (0, 1) (24)
s.t.
ci,t + ψ[ai,t+1 − ai,t] ≤ mi,twhereψ, δ ∈ [0, 1] (25)
and
ci,t + ai,t+1 − ai,t + pit+1mi,t+1 = yi,t − τt(yi,t) +mi,t + ζt (26)
For the derivation of the first order conditions consider the Lagrangian:
L=
∞∑
t=0
βti [u(ci,t) + λi,t{mi,t − ci,t − ψ(ai,t+1 − ai,t)}+
θi,t{yi,t − τt(yi,t) +mi,t + ζt − ci,t − ai,t+1 + ai,t − pit+1mi,t+1}]
Assuming ci,t > 0;λi,t ≥ 0; θi,t > 0;mi,t+1 ≥ 0
ci,t :
u′(ci,t) = λi,t + θi,t
mi,t+1 :
θi,tpit+1 − βi(λi,t+1 + θi,t+1) = 0 (27)
ai,t+1 :
ψλi,t + θi,t − βi[ψλi,t+1 + θi,t+1{rt+1(1− τ ′(yi,t)) + 1}] ≤ 0
and ai,t+1[ψλi,t + θi,t − βi[ψλi,t+1 + θi,t+1{rt+1(1− τ ′(yi,t)) + 1}] = 0 (28)
λi,t :
mi,t − ci,t − ψ(ai,t+1 − ai,t) ≥ 0 and λi,t[mi,t − ci,t − ψ(ai,t+1 − ai,t)] = 0 (29)
θi,t :
yi,t − τt(yi,t) +mi,t − ci,t − ai,t+1 + ai,t − pit+1mi,t+1 + +ζt = 0 (30)
If money is held, we have:
θi,t = u
′(ci,t)− λi,t = βi
pit+1
u′(ci,t+1) (31)
Combining the above equations we get the following, Euler equation:
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ψu
′
(ci,t) = [βiψ − (1− ψ) βi
pit+1
]u′(ci,t+1) + β2i {
1
pit+1
(rt+1 − τ ′t(yi,t+1)rt+1 + 1)−
ψ
pit+2
}u′(ci,t+2)
For the cash-in-advance constraint to be binding, we must have λi,t > 0; which implies
u′(ci,t)− β
pit+1
u′(ci,t+1) > 0 (32)
The above condition can be interpreted as the following: For the CIA to be binding we
must have, the marginal benefit (achieved from increasing consumption by one unit today)
exceed the marginal cost to the agent (due to the discounted value of the decrease in the
money holdings by pit+1 units today).
A.5 Aggregation:
Aggregating the individual budget constraints over the entire economy we get,
s∑
i=1
µi[ci,t + ai,t+1 − ai,t + pit+1mi,t+1] ≤
s∑
i=1
µi[yi,t − τt(yi,t) +mi,t] + ζt (33)
s∑
i=1
µi[ci,t+ai,t+1−ai,t+pit+1mi,t+1] ≤
s∑
i=1
µi(wtei+rtai,t)−
s∑
i=1
µiτt(yi,t)+
s∑
i=1
µimi,t+ζt (34)
Using market clearing conditions and re-writing we get back the goods market clearing
condition:
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt = Yt (35)
A.6 Transformed variables
Consider the following transformed variables:
ĉi =
ci,t
γt
; âi =
ai,t
γt
; m̂i =
mi,t
γt
; ŵ =
wt
γt
; ŷi =
yi,t
γt
;R = Rt; r = rt; pi = pit ;
ζt
γt
= ζ∀t (36)
Also, rewriting the tax function from the text we have,
Tax schedule = ATR = η(
yit
κγt
)φ = η(
ŷi
κ
)φwith 0 ≤ η < 1, φ > 0, κ > 0 (37)
Total tax paid = τt(yit) = yitη(
yit
κγt
)φ (38)
gives
MTR = τ ′t(yit) = (1 + φ)η(
ŷi
κ
)φ = (1 + φ)ATR (39)
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Rewriting the first order conditions in terms of the transformed variables, we get 3 equa-
tions in 3 unknowns (m̂i, ĉi, âi) :
m̂i − ĉi − ψ(γ − 1)âi = 0
ŷi − τ˜(ŷi) + (1− piγ)m̂i − ĉi + (1− γ)âi + ζ = 0
ψ = βi[ψ − (1− ψ)
pit+1
]γ−σ + β2i
1
pi
[r − r(1 + φ)η( ŷi
κ
)φ + 1− ψ]γ−2σ
where ŷi = ŵei + râi
Now substituting this back into the Euler equation we get :
ŷi = κ[
(r + 1− ψ)β2i + γ2(piψ − 1 + ψ)βi − ψpiγ2σ
β2i rη(1 + φ)
]
1
φ = h(r, βi) (40)
A.7 Calibration procedure
Using the functional forms and parameters discussed in the text, we fix β10, to compute ŷ10
along a balanced growth path according to (40).
Since,
ŷs = h(r, βs)
Using data on {ŷi}10i=1 we can compute: the following ratio:
ŷi
ŷs
=
h(r, βi)
h(r, βs)
(41)
This can be used to compute {β̂i}9i=1. Then we can find the respective average incomes
{ŷi}9i=1 according to (40)
Also,
ŵ = (1− α)(r
∗ + δ
α
)
α
α− 1 (42)
ŷi = ŵ(r)ei + râi
âi =
ŷi
r∗
− ŵ
r∗
ei =
h(r, βi)
r∗
− ŵ
r∗
ei
s∑
i=1
µiâi =
s∑
i=1
µi[
h(r, βi)
r∗
− ŵ
r∗
ei] = K̂
s(r) (43)
The above equation tells us the supply of assets in the economy. We also normalize
s∑
i=1
µiei = 1.
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r∗ = α(
Kt
AtLt
)α−1 − δ = aR− δ (44)
Kt
AtLt
= (
α
r∗ + δ
)
1
1−α = K̂d(r) (45)
The above equation tells us the demand for assets in the economy. In order to find the
equilibrium interest rate, we find r* such that the supply of assets equals demand of assets
in the economy, that is:
K̂s(r) = K̂d(r) (46)
If K̂s(r) > K̂d(r), we will decrease the rate of interest and if K̂s(r) < K̂d(r), then we
will increase the rate of interest, till supply equals demand.
Now eliminating ĉi from the following equations :
m̂i − ĉi − ψ(γ − 1)âi = 0 (47)
ŷi − τ˜(ŷi) + (1− piγ)m̂i − ĉi + (1− γ)âi + ζ = 0 (48)
we get,
m̂i − ψ(γ − 1)âi = ŷi − τ˜(ŷi) + (1− piγ)m̂i + (1− γ)âi + ζ (49)
Aggregating the above equation and re-arranging we get,
piγ
s∑
i=1
µim̂i + (γ − 1)(1− ψ)
s∑
i=1
µiâi =
s∑
i=1
µi(ŷi − τ˜(ŷi)) + ζ (50)
Substituting the following expression for transfers in the above equation:
ζ = (g − 1)
s∑
i=1
µim̂i (51)
we get,
[
piγ
g − 1 − 1]ζ =
s∑
i=1
µi(ŷi − τ˜(ŷi))− (γ − 1)(1− ψ)
s∑
i=1
µiâi (52)
Since piγ = g,
ζ̂ = (g − 1)[
s∑
i=1
µiŷi{1− η( ŷi
κ
)φ} − (γ − 1)(1− ψ)
s∑
i=1
µiâi (53)
Now, we define wealth of individual i as the sum of individual assets and money holdings,
that is
Ŵi = âi + m̂i (54)
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Ŵi(r
∗, βi, ei) =
1
g
[ŷi{1− η( ŷi
κ
)φ}+ ζ̂ + {g − (γ − 1)(1− ψ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
âi] (55)
Ŵi(r
∗, βi, ei) =
1
g
[ŷi{1− η( ŷi
κ
)φ}+ ζ̂ + χ
r∗
ŷi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ωi
− χ ŵ
r∗
ei] (56)
Now let us define:
ρi =
Ŵi(r
∗, βi, ei)
Ŵ1(r∗, β1, e1)
=
Ωi − χ ŵr∗ ei
Ω1 − χ ŵr∗ e1
(57)
The above ratio can be computed from the data on wealth of the ten income groups from
in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) sample Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011). We can
find e1 by aggregating the above equation. Similarly, we can find labor productivity using
the same equation for {ei}i=si=2
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